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International Third Party Dispute
Settlement*
RICHARD
I.

B. BILDER**

INTRODUCTION

From earliest times, third parties have played an important role in
attempting to resolve interpersonal and intergroup conflicts. Indeed, the
concept of third-party dispute settlement and roles of judge, arbitrator
and mediator pervade all human societies and are closely linked to the
emergence of political order and law.
It is not practical in this brief article to review either the long historical experience of international third party dispute settlement or the extensive descriptive and analytical literature it has produced.' My purpose
* This article was originally written as a background paper for the United States

Institute of Peace Conference on "Toward the Twenty-First Century: An Investigation of
the Roads to Peace," held June 20-21, 1988 at Airlie House, Airlie, Virginia. It will
eventually be published in the proceedings of that conference.
** Burrus-Bascom Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin -Madison. B.A., Williams
College, 1949; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1956.
1. This initial note is intended to provide an introductory bibliography of international
third-party dispute settlement. Unless otherwise stated, works cited by author in subsequent notes refer to works more fully cited here.
For legally-oriented overviews of international dispute settlement see, e.g., Bilder, An
Overview of International Dispute Settlement, 1 EMORY J. INT'L DISPUTE RESOLUTION 1
(1986); Bilder, InternationalDispute Settlement and the Role of Adjudication, 1 EMORY J.
INT'L DISPUTE RESOLUTION 131 (1987); MERRILLS, INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
(1984); INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES: THE LEGAL ASPECTS (H. Waldock ed. 1972); F. NORTHEDGE
& M.DONELAN,INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES: THE POLITICAL ASPECTS (David Davies Memorial

Institute 1971); 0. Schachter, International Law in Theory and Practice, 178 RECUXIL DES
COURS 10 (1981); Sohn, The Future of Dispute Settlement, THE STRUCTURE AND PROCESS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY, DOCTRINES AND THEORY 1121 (R. J. Mac-

Donald & D. M. Johnson eds. 1983); D. Bowett, Contemporary Developments in Legal
Techniques in the Settlement of Disputes, 180 RECUEIL DES COURS 177 (1983); Laylin, Out-

lines for Third Partiesin InternationalDisputes, 66 PROC. AM. Soc. INT'L L. 22 (1972); 4 C.
DE VISCHER, THEORY AND REALITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (Corbett trans. 1968); INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS ch. 13 (L. Henkin, R. Pugh, 0. Schachter & H. Smite

eds. 1980) [hereinafter Henkin]; H. LAUTERPACHT, THE FUNCTION OF LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY (1933); DISPUTE SETTLEMENT THROUGH THE UNITED NATIONS (K. Raman
ed. 1977) [hereinafter Raman]; RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES sec. 902 (1988) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]; Lachs, Some Reflections on the
Settlement of InternationalDisputes, 68 PROC. AM. SOC. INT'L L. 323 (1974); RANDOLPH,

(1973); Pechota, Complementary Structures of Third-Party Settlement in InternationalDisputes (UNITAR Study
P.S. No. 3, 1971). On dispute settlement in particular fields, see Sohn, Settlement of Disputes Arising Out of the Law of the Sea Convention, 12 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 495 (1975);
Bilder, The Settlement of Disputes in the Field of the InternationalLaw of the EnvironTHIRD PARTY SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES IN THEORY AND PRACTICE
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is rather to suggest some basic questions and tentative answers which
may help to provide a framework for further thinking, discussion and re-

ment, 1 RECUEIL DES COURS 139 (1975). Hudec, Reforming GATT Adjudication Procedures:
The Lessons of the DISC Case, 72 MINN. L. R. (1988); R. LILLICH (ed.), THE IRAN-UNITED
STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL 1981-83 (1984).
Among recent legally-oriented empirical or otherwise less-traditional studies, see e.g.,
Bailey, Peaceful Settlement of InternationalDisputes, Raman, supra; T. FRANCK, THE

(1968); J. GAMBLE & D. FISCHER, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF
(1976); G. RAYMOND, CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND THE
STRUCTURE OF THE STATE SYSTEM: AN ANALYSIS OF ARBITRATIVE SETTLEMENTS (1980); A.
STUYT, SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS 1794-1970 (1972); F. NORTHEDGE & GRIEVE,
INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES: CASE HISTORIES 1945-70 (1973); McGinley, Ordering a Savage Society, 25 HARv. INT'L. L. J. 43 (1984); Coplin & Rochester, The Permanent Court of International Justice, The International Court of Justice, The League of Nations and the
STRUCTURE OF IMPARTIALITY

JUSTICE: AN ANALYSIS OF A FAILURE

United Nations: A Comparative Empirical Survey, 66 AM. POL. Scl. REV. 529 (1972); and L.
PROTT, THE LATENT POWER OF CULTURE AND THE INTERNATIONAL JUDGE (1979).
For recent overviews of international dispute settlement primarily from an international relations or social psychological perspective, see e.g., D.G. PRUITT & J.Z. RUBIN, SOCIAL CONFLICT: ESCALATION, STALEMATE, AND SETTLEMENT (1986); M. PATCHEN, RESOLVING
DISPUTES BETWEEN NATIONS: COERCION OR CONCILIATION?

(1988); J.

BERCOVITCH, SOCIAL

CONFLICTS AND THIRD PARTIES: STRATEGIES OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION (1984);

W.

ZARTMAN,

THE 50% SOLUTION (1976); W. ZARTMAN, RIPE FOR RESOLUTION (1985); NEW ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL CRISIS MANAGEMENT (G. Winhan ed. 1988); D.G. PRUITT, NEGOTIATION BEHAVIOR
(1981); J.Z. RUBIN, DYNAMICS OF THIRD-PARTY INTERVENTION: KISSINGER IN THE MIDDLE EAST

(1981); J.Z. Rubin, Experimental Research on Third-Party Intervention in Conflict: Towards Some Generalizations,87 PSYCHOLOGY BULL. 379 (1980); J.A. Wall, Third Party Consultation as a Method of Intergroup Conflict Resolution, 27 J. CONFLICT RESOLUTION 301
(1983). Among many other useful political or social science-oriented works, see e.g., J.Z.
RUBIN & B.R. BROWN, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF BARGAINING AND NEGOTIATION (1975);
R.L. BUTTERWORTH, MANAGING INTERSTATE CONFLICTS 1945-1974 (1976); MANAGING INTERNATIONAL CRISES (D. Frei ed. 1982); N. CHOUCRI & R. NORTH, NATIONS IN CONFLICT (1976); R.J.
RUMMEL, JR., UNDERSTANDING CONFLICT AND WAR (1975); G. SNYDER & P. DIESENG, CONFLICT
AMONG NATIONS (1977); J.G. STOESSINGER, WHY NATIONS GO TO WAR (3d ed. 1982); Z. MAOZ,
PATHS TO CONFLICT: INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE INITIATION 1816-1976 (1982); S. ROBERTS, ORDER AND DISPUTES (1979); C.R. MITCHELL, THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT
(1981); D. YOUNG, THE POLITICS OF FORCE (1968); R.N. LEBOW, BETWEEN PEACE AND WAR:
THE NATURE OF INTERNATIONAL CRISIS (1981); D. YOUNG, THE INTERMEDIARIES: THIRD PARTIES IN INTERNATIONAL CRISES (1967); R. SMOKE, WAR: CONTROLLING ESCALATION (1977); THE
MAN IN THE MIDDLE: INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (S. Touval & I.
Zartman eds. 1985); J.W. BURTON, CONFLICT AND COMMUNICATION (1969); J.W. BURTON,
RESOLVING DEEP ROOTED CONFLICT (1987); J.R. MITCHELL, THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT (1981); CONFLICT IN WORLD SOCIETY (M. Banks ed. 1984); R. FISHER & W.
URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN (1981); R. JERVIS, PER-

(1976).
There are also many case studies of third party intervention in particular conflicts or
dispute, for example Rubin, supra (1981); M. HASTINGS & S. JENKINS, BATTLE FOR THE FALKCEPTION AND MISPERCEPTION IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

(1983); R.L. KENNEDY, THIRTEEN
(1969); J. CARTER, KEEPING FAITH (1982).
LANDS

DAYS:

A

MEMOIR OF THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS

Among the leading scholarly journals relevant to these problems are the American Jour-

nal of International Law, the Journal of Conflict Resolution, and the Negotiation Journal.
For examples of the recent interesting and sophisticated empirical and theoretical research on dispute processing within domestic societies, and particularly the United States,
see e.g., M. Galanter, Adjudication, Litigation, and Related Phenomena, LAW AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (L. Lipson & S. Wheeler eds. 1986); materials collected and cited in Special
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search about the potential role of third party intervention.'
Several introductory comments may be in order. First, third party
intervention is not simply a "legal" means of dispute settlement, but is
relevant to many kinds of conflict resolution processes. International lawyers have tended, of course, to look principally at the more formal, institutionalized and "legal" aspects of international third-party dispute settlement-in particular, international adjudication.' The International
Court of Justice's (I.C.J.'s) recent assertion of jurisdiction and ruling
against the U.S. in the Nicaraguacase", and the Reagan Administration's

Issue on Dispute Processing and Civil Litigation, 15 LAW & Soc'v REV. 389-928 (1980-81);
DISPUTE RESOLUTION, (S. Goldberg, E. Green & F. Sander eds. 1985); DISPUTING IN AMERICA:
THE CHANGING ROLE OF LAWYERS (E. Green, J. Marks & F. Sander eds. 1985) See also
Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing, 70 F.R.D. 111 (1976); and Galanter, Reading the
Landscape of Disputes: What We Know And Don't Know (And Think We Know) About
Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4 (1983); C. WITTy,
MEDIATION AND SOCIETY (1980); Silbey and Merry, Mediator Settlement Strategies, 8 LAW &
POL'Y 7 (1987); Kressel & Pruitt, Themes in the Mediation of Social Conflict, 41 J. Soc.
ISSUES 179 (1985); V. Aubert, Competition and Dissensus: Two Types of Conflict and Conflict Resolution, 7 J. CONFLICT RESOLUTION 26 (1963); T. Eckhoff, The Mediator and the
Judge, 10 ACTA SOCIOLOGICA 158 (1986); 0. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073
(1984); Mather & Ynvesson, Language, Audience and the Transformation of Disputes, 15
LAW & Soc. REV. 775 (1980-81); C. Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. REV. 754; S. Merry, Disputing Without Culture, 100 HARV. L. REV. 2057 (1987); Fuller, Mediation-Its Forms and Functions,
44 So. CALIF. L. REV. 305 (1971); Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV.
L. REV. 353 (1979); Wagatswma & Rossett, The Implications of Apology, 20 LAW & Soc.
REV. 461 (1980); B. Yngvesson, Reexamining ContinuingRelations and the Law, 1985 Wisc.
L. REV. 623; S. Sibley and A. Sarat, Dispute Processing in Law and Legal Scholarship;
DPRP Working Paper 8:9 (June 1988) (U. Wis.-Madison Inst. for Legal Studies); D. KOLB,
THE MEDIATORS (1985).
On the growing interest among U.S. scholars and practitioners in non-judicial or "alter-

native" dispute resolution, see references above and, L.

KONOWITZ, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE

RESOLUTION: CASES AND MATERIALS (1985).

For interesting discussions of disputes and dispute processing from a broader crosscultural and anthropological perspective, see e.g., Abel, A Comparative Theory of Dispute
Institutions in Society, 8 LAW & Soc. REV. 217 (1973); S. ROBERTS, ORDER AND DISPUTES
(1979); P. GULLIVER, DISPUTES AND NEGOTIATIONS: A CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE (1979);
THE DISPUTING PROCESS-LAW IN TEN SOCIETIES (L. Nader & H. Todd eds. 1978); F.G. Sny-

der, Anthropology, Dispute Processes and Law: A Cultural Introduction, 8 BRIT. J. L. &
Soc'Y 141 (1981).
2. Certain parts of this paper draw upon my two articles on dispute settlement and
adjudication, An Overview of InternationalDispute Settlement, supra note 1 and International Dispute Settlement and the Role of Adjudication, supra note 1.
3. See, e.g., references cited in the first paragraph of supra note 1.
4. Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicargua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 392 (Judgment of Nov. 26, 1984 on Jurisdiction and Admissibility),
reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 468 (1984); 1986 I.C.J. 14 (Judgment of June 27, 1986 on Merits),
reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 1023 (1986). Among the many articles analyzing and discussing the
decision and various aspects of the case, see, e.g., articles and comments in 79 AM. J. INT'L
L. at 373-405, 423-30, 652-64, and 992-1005 (1985) (dealing with jurisdictional phase), and
81 AM. J. INT'L L. at 77-183 (1987) (dealing with merits); Chayes, Nicaragua, the United
States and the World Court, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1445 (1985); Moore, The Secret War in
Central America and the Future of World Order, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 24 (1980); Reisman,
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related decision to withdraw the declaration made by the U.S. in 1946
submitting to the Court's compulsory jurisdiction, has certainly heightened current interest in the role of international arbitral tribunals and
courts.' In contrast, however, political scientists and social psychologists
have focused their attention primarily on mediation and other non-binding types of dispute-resolution processes; indeed, their writings have
largely ignored the role of either law or of formal legal techniques such as
adjudication in international conflict resolution.'
Clearly, any approach to thinking about international conflict resolution should take into account all of the types of factors which may affect
the usefulness and success of third party -intervention-normative influences, power-political interests, the parties' perceptions and attitudes.
Our understanding will best be served by pursuing both legal and social
science research and combining a variety of disciplinary perspectives.
Second, third party dispute settlement is only one way of trying to
resolve international conflicts, and can be understood only in the context
of a general study of dispute-settlement problems and processes. While
an exploration of these broad underlying questions is beyond the scope of
this paper, they include: first, what do we mean by "conflicts" and "disputes"?; second, what causes conflicts and disputes?; third, do we need to
settle conflicts and disputes, and, if so, which ones and why?; fourth, do
states have any international obligation to settle their disputes peacefully?; fifth, what kinds of international disputes are there, how frequently do they arise, between or among what states, and involving what
kinds of claims?; sixth, do disputes or conflicts follow typical patterns or
"life cycles"?; seventh, what techniques or procedures are available in
general for settling international disputes?; eighth, when is a dispute
"settled"?; ninth, how can disputes be avoided?; and tenth, what is the
7
relevance of law or normative considerations to dispute settlement?

II. WHAT Do WE MEAN By "THIRD-PARTY DIsPuTE SETTLEMENT"?
A "third-party" can be defined as an individual or collective that is
external to a dispute between two or more others and that either tries to
help the disputants reach a settlement or, in some cases, is authorized on
its own to determine a settlement.' Thus, a third-party may be another
state or group of states (i.e. Algeria in the U.S.-Iran hostage crisis); a governmental international organization (i.e. the U.N. or O.A.S.); an international court (i.e. the I.C.J.) or an arbitrator or arbitration panel (i.e. the

Has the InternationalCourt Exceeded its Jurisdiction? 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 128 (1986).

5. See Secretary of State Schultz's letter to U.N. Secretary General, Oct. 7, 1985; Dept.
of State statement of Oct. 7, 1985; and Legal Adviser Sofaer's statement of Dec. 4, 1985, all
reprinted in 86 DEP'T ST. BULL. No. 2106 at 67 (Jan. 1986) and 24 I.L.M. 1742 (1985).
6. See, e.g., the references cited in the third paragraph of supra note 1.
7. For a discussion of some of these broader issues, see, e.g., Bilder, An Overview of
InternationalDispute Settlement, supra note 1.
8. This definition draws on, Puirr AND RUBIN, supra note 1, at 165-66.
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U.S.-Iran Claims Tribunal); a non-governmental organization (i.e. the International Committee of the Red Cross); or an individual or group of
individuals functioning either in a representative capacity (i.e. a U.N.appointed mediator) or conceivably in a private capacity. In the interest
of impartiality, mediators, arbitrators or judges (or at least most of the
judges on an international court) will usually be of a nationality other
than that of the disputing parties. However, this need not be the case so
long as the third-party is perceived by the disputants as "external" to the
dispute and capable of performing impartially and effectively the role of a
third-party. For example, the U.S. and Canada have frequently utilized
binational panels in dispute settlement roles (i.e. the arbitral panels established under the Jay Treaty, the U.S.-Canada International Joint
Commission, and the binational panels which will be set up to review antidumping and countervailing duty determinations under Chapter 19 of
the proposed Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement)."
"Third-party intervention" has, in turn, been defined as
"[I] ntervention into a dispute of a person or agency whose purpose it is to
act as an instrument for bringing about a peaceful settlement of that dispute, while creating structures whereby the foundations of a lasting settlement may be laid,"' 0 or, more broadly, as "[Any action taken by an
actor that is not a direct party to the crisis, that is designed to reduce or
remove one or more problems in the bargaining relationship and, therefore, to facilitate the termination of the conflict itself."" International
lawyers and others appear to sometimes use the term "third-party dispute-settlement" to refer, not to the broad political processes of thirdparty intervention but only to the more formalized and regularized structure of norms, institutions, arrangements and procedures which are recognized parts of the international legal order - in particular, techniques
and procedures for binding adjudication utilizing arbitral tribunals or the
I.C.J. However, I will here use "third party intervention" and "third
party dispute settlement" interchangeably. It is important to note that
third parties can play an important part in managing, deescalating or
damping disputes, even if such efforts do not result in a final resolution of
the disputes. That is any enquiry into the role of third parties should
appropriately address and encompass their function in "dispute-management and processing," as well as in "dispute resolution and settlement."

9. See Bilder, When Neighbors Quarrel: Canada-U.S. Dispute Settlement Experience
(the 1986-87 Claude T. Bissell Lectures, University of Toronto), Inst. for Legal Studies,
Univ. of Wisconsin Law School, Disputes Processing Research Program Working Paper 8:4
(May 1987); J.-G. Castel, The Settlement of Disputes Under the 1988 Canada-United
States Free Trade Agreement, 83 AM. J. INT'L. L. 118 (1989); McDorman, The Dispute
Settlement Regime of the Free Trade Agreement, 2 REv. INT'L. Bus. L. 303 (1988).
10. BERCOVITCH, supra note 1, at 13, citing Harbottle, The Strategy of Third Party
Intervention in Conflict Resolution, 35 INT'L J. 118, 120 (1979-80).
11. Young, infra note 17, at 34.
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III. Do STATES HAVE AN OBLIGATION To SUBMIT THEIR DISPUTES To
THIRD PARTIES EITHER FOR HELP OR FOR BINDING SETTLEMENT?

It is well established that, absent special agreement, states have no
obligation to submit their disputes to third parties either for help in
achieving settlement or, a fortiori, for binding settlement by such third
parties.1" Consequently, the use of most third-party dispute settlement
techniques, and in particular resort to arbitration or judicial settlement,
depends upon the acquiescence of the disputing parties and cannot occur
without their consent.
However, those states that are members of the U.N. (which means, in

effect, almost all of the world's nations) have assumed under the Charter
treaty obligations to accept at least some limited types of third party intervention, particularly as regards disputes whose continuation "[ils likely
to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security."1 3 And,
under Art. 33(2) of the Charter, the Security Council shall, when it deems
necessary, call upon the parties to settle their dispute by the means
(which include third-party means) listed in Art. 33(1) of the Charter.
It is, of course, also open to nations to enter into international agreements with each other which include so-called "compromissory clauses"
or other obligations and arrangements to settle their disputes peacefully,
and a great number (probably thousands) of such agreements are in effect.14 Frequently, such agreements will not only include general obliga12. See, e.g., An Overview of InternationalDispute Settlement, supra note 1, at 7-13.
See also Henkin, supra note 1, at 910, "As long as a State does not resort to force, there has
been no disposition to find a violation of law in failure to settle disputes peacefully, as by
leaving them unsettled."
See also RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, sec. 902, comment (e):
It is well established in international law that no State can, without its consent, be compelled to submit its disputes with other states either to mediation
or to arbitration, or to any other kind of pacific settlement. Eastern Carelia
(Finland v. Russia), 1923 P.C.I.J., ser. B, No. 5 at 27 (Advisory Opinion of July
23). Consequently, international claims cannot, in the present state of the law
as to international jurisdiction, be submitted to a tribunal, except with the
consent of the States concerned.
Reparation for Injuries, 1949 I.C.J. Rep. 177-78 (Advisory Opinion of April 11).
As to arbitration, see also the Ambatielos case (Greece v. U.K.) 1953 I.C.J. 10, 19 (Judgment of May 19) ("a State may not be compelled to submit its disputes to arbitration without its consent.").
13. See, inter alia, U.N. Charter arts.1(1), 2(3), 33, Ch. VI (arts. 33-38) and Ch. VII
(arts. 39-51).
14. For example, there are some 250 agreements, bilateral and multilateral, conferring
on the I.C.J. jurisdiction over disputes as to the interpretation or application of the agreements. See 1983-84 I.C.J.Y.B. 51-56, 92-108 (1984). See generally, Sohn, Settlement of Disputes Relating to the Interpretationand Application of Treaties, 150 RECUEIL DES COURS
(1976) and Morrison, Treaties as a Source of Jurisdictionfor the InternationalCourt of
Justice, in THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AT A CROSSROADS (L.F. Damrosch ed.
1987) [hereinafterDamrosch]. There are many additional agreements containing provisions
for dispute settlement by means other than reference to the World Court. See, e.g., Sohn,
supra note 1, and UNITED NATIONS, A SURVEY OF TREATY PROVISIONS FOR THE PACIFIC SET-
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tions of peaceful settlement, but will require, recommend, or provide procedures for the use of specific dispute settlement techniques, such as
conciliation, arbitration, adjudication or other third party techniques.
It is an interesting question whether the international community interest in peaceful settlement of disputes suggests the need for expanding
the duty of states to resort to at least certain non-binding methods of
third-party dispute-settlement, even in the absence of their consent.
IV.

WHY

Do

DISPUTING STATES TURN

To

THIRD PARTIES?

Third party dispute settlement is primarily a supplementary means
of conflict resolution. Typically, it will be used only when either: (1) the
disputing states are unwilling to reach a settlement themselves and wish
the help of third parties to do so; or (2) a third party is otherwise authorized or in a position to intervene to affect the settlement or outcome of
the dispute. Professor Louis Sohn points out that, "[I]t is an axiom of
international diplomacy that the most efficient method of settling international disputes is through negotiations between the two governments
concerned, without any meddling of third parties, other states or international organizations," and that "in most instances negotiations lead to a
solution."15 Negotiations are the preferred means of resolving disputes for
many reasons. Perhaps the most important is that it is the least risky way
the parties can try to resolve their dispute. Thus, negotiation permits
each state maximum control over both the dispute settlement process and
outcome, since each state always has the option of simply walking away
from the negotiation and not agreeing. In contrast, any kind of thirdparty involvement carries a risk of reducing a disputing state's flexibility
and freedom to do what it wants, and of somehow trapping it into an
undesirable outcome. Some other advantages of negotiation are that negotiation places responsibility for resolving the dispute on the parties
themselves, who are in the best position to develop a sensible, workable
and acceptable solution. Negotiation works toward a freely agreed rather
than imposed solution, which is likely to have maximum acceptability
and stability, negotiation favors compromise and accommodation, which
is most likely to preserve good long-term cooperative relations between
the parties, and negotiation is generally simpler and less costly than alternative dispute settlement methods. So long as disputing states are making some progress towards solving their dispute themselves, they will normally have little reason to turn to third parties, and, conversely, third
parties will have little reason to intervene.
Consequently, one would expect disputing states to seek or acquiesce
in third-party intervention only when their own efforts to reach a negotiated settlement have been unavailing and are at an impasse, and where
neither prefers such a failure to reach agreement to the alternative possi-

TLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL DIsPUTEs, at 1949-62 (1966).

15. Sohn, supra note 1, at 1122.
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bility of continuing to seek settlement through assistance by, or delegation to, third parties. In this case, both parties may choose to ask third
parties for help in their attempts to reach an agreement or, at the extreme, they may simply ask or allow a third party to determine the settlement or outcome.
Presumably, in deciding whether to seek or acquiesce in third-party
dispute settlement procedures, each party will weigh what it thinks it
may gain from such intervention against the risks and constraints on its
control of the situation and outcomes that the particular third party techniques may involve. We would expect that, typically, the party in the
more powerful negotiating position might be particularly reluctant to accept third party intervention, since such intervention may have the effect
of counterbalancing or neutralizing its bargaining power. But sometimes,
even for the stronger party, the risks of conflict, continued dispute, or
unfavorable internal or external public opinion may outweigh even substantial risks from third party intervention.
Of course, a state's apparent consent to third party intervention may
not in fact be serious or sincere; a state may pretend to agree simply to
appeal to internal or external public opinion or seem like a "good citizen," but without any real intention of compromise or cooperation in a
good faith effort to settle the dispute. Indeed, both disputing parties may
find it useful to appear to be doing something by accepting third party
intervention, even though neither really expects such intervention to be
successful, or at least to do any more than ratify the outcome that would
have occurred anyway. In some cases, for example, agreements may contain nominal obligations, included solely to pacify an internal political
constituency of one of the parties, which neither expects to be observed.
If and when such "noncompliance" occurs, the party will complain and
dispute the matter although it cannot in good faith insist on its position.
By resorting to third party dispute settlement techniques, including adjudication, the parties can delay and look as though they are trying to adjust the question while ultimately reaching the outcome they always
intended."6
In practice, the context of each dispute and conflict is likely to be
unique, and many factors may bear upon the willingness of disputing
states to seek or accept third party intervention. In the first place, such
attitudes obviously will vary depending on the particular circumstances
and stakes involved, the type of intervention contemplated, and who the
third parties are likely to be. For example, a state may be willing to accept non-binding U.N. mediation but not a binding I.C.J. decision, or accepting fact-finding by neutral State 'A' but not hostile State 'B'. Second,
as a threshold condition, disputing states must believe that there are

16. For an interesting discussion of such "latent" functions of adjudication, see Hudec,
Transcending the Ostensible: Some Reflections on the Nature of Litigation Between Governments, 72 MINN. L. REV. 211 (1987).
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things third parties can do that are more likely to be helpful than harmful and they must be willing, at a minimum, to let third parties try. This
means that third-party intervention will often have at least two stages or
phases: an initial "jurisdictional" phase in which the parties are persuaded to seek or acquiesce in a third party having some role (or the third
party otherwise establishes its right to do so); and a substantive or "merits" phase where the third party actually attempts to help settle the dispute. Third, it may not always be easy to say when the disputants are in
fact at an "impasse"; for example, a state in a weaker bargaining position
may seek third party intervention in hopes of thus obtaining an outcome
better than it can obtain itself, even though it is prepared, if its efforts to
involve third parties prove unsuccessful, to agree to a less favorable settlement. Fourth, even where states are reluctant to accept third party intervention, they may, as previously noted, have previously undertaken legal obligations to do so under the U.N. Charter, the I.C.J. statute or other
international agreements. Indeed, serious problems may arise where a
third party, at the request of one party to a dispute, intervenes based on
what it construes as the other party's prior consent, but the other party is
no longer willing to accept such intervention or claims that it had never
given consent. Recent experience, in the Nicaragua and other cases,
raises questions as to the usefulness or effectiveness of third party intervention in the absence of real and continuing consent on the part of all of
the disputing parties.
Finally, third party intervention may occur even in the absence of
impasse between disputing states or indeed of real consent by one or both
parties. Thus, the third state may have its own interest in promoting or
preventing a particular outcome (i.e., helping an ally or hurting an enemy). Indeed, in some situations, the "selfish interest" of the intervening
state may be so great that its role is better analyzed as that of a third
party to the dispute, rather than as an external third party concerned
only with helping the parties resolving the dispute. Or, as often the case,
the international community as a whole may have its own interest in
resolving conflicts or preventing unjust or unstable settlements which
might escalate or spill over to threaten other states. Much of the U.N.'s
interventionary authority, under Chapters VI and VII of the Charter, are
based on this premise. Indeed, it is worth noting that the international
community might wish to intervene even if the disputing states were able
themselves to agree easily on a settlement with which they were quite
content. For example, the U.N. or third states might wish to intervene in
a bilateral settlement of a transfrontier pollution dispute in which the
two states agreed to solve the problem by dumping large amounts of the
pollutant into the ocean in a way which threatened serious injury to the
ocean environment.
V.

WHY ARE THIRD PARTIES WILLING

To

INTERVENE?

Performing a third-party role in dispute settlement is not an easy
task; it can be arduous and costly (i.e., the U.S. role in the various mid-
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east crises), dangerous (i.e., the assassination of Count Bernadotte) or
unrewarding (i.e., the U.S. role in the Falkland-Malvinas war). Indeed,
third parties may run serious risks of becoming caught up in, or
blackmailed into, a continuing role in a long-drawn-out dispute or conflict, or of being blamed by one or both of the parties for unfavorable
outcomes.
There appear to be various reasons why third parties are willing to
intervene, including the following:
First, the third-party may have a legal or institutional responsibility
to do so; it may simply be the third party's job or raison d'etre. For example, serving as third parties in dispute settlement for which international judges, arbitrators and U.N. Secretary-Generals are paid.
Second, the third party may have a sense of public responsibility, as
well as perhaps a desire for the prestige and honor that may accompany a
successful third party role. Algeria's role in the Iran Hostages dispute, the
Pope's role in the Argentina-Chile Beagle Channel dispute, or the Soviet
mediation of the Kashmir dispute may be examples.
Finally, as previously noted, the third party may have its own interests or the interests of an ally at stake, which it believes will be protected
or advanced by its intervention and third-party role.
Of course, several of these motives may combine - as may be the
case, for example, with U.S. intervention in the Middle East or the "Contadora" states' intervention in the Nicaraguan conflict.
VI.

WHAT KINDS OF THIRD-PARTY TECHNIQUES ARE AVAILABLE?

The most usual and accepted list of methods of peaceful settlement
of international disputes - and the one most familiar to international
lawyers - is that set forth in Article 33 of the U.N. Charter - negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, and resort to the U.N. or other
international organization dispute settlement procedures. In essence, this
list of methods reflects a spectrum or continuum of techniques ranging
from so-called "diplomatic means," which give control of the outcome primarily to the parties themselves, to so-called "legal means" which give
control of the outcome primarily to a third party or parties. That is, the
principal difference among these techniques is in the extent to which
third parties can legitimately participate in helping to bring about or determining the settlement and, conversely, the extent to which the parties
can reject a settlement proposed by the third party. In practice, distinctions between these techniques may be more theoretical than real, and a
particular process of dispute settlement may combine elements of various
techniques. For example, international arbitration or adjudication may
often embody compromises reflecting strong elements of negotiation or
mediation among the arbitrators or judges, at least some of whom may
see their role as safeguarding the interests or representing the point of
view of one or the other party. Negotiators will often have to make their
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bargaining decisions with the possibility of third party intervention, or
perhaps even resort to adjudication, in mind.
The more traditional third-party methods of peaceful settlement,
each of which has its own distinctive characteristics, are the following:
Good offices and mediation" are techniques in which the parties, unable to resolve a dispute by negotiation, request or agree to limited intervention by a third party to help them break the impasse. In the case of
good offices, the role of the third party is usually limited to simply bringing the parties into communication and facilitating their negotiations. In
the case of mediation, the mediator usually plays a more active part in
facilitating communications and negotiations between the parties, and is
sometimes permitted or expected to advance informal and nonbinding
proposals of his or her own. President Carter's mediation leading to the
Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty is a recent example of successful mediation.
Fact-finding, inquiry and conciliation' are methods of settlement in
which the parties request or agree to the intervention of a third party,
usually on a more formal basis, for the purpose of determining particular
facts or otherwise conducting an impartial examination of the dispute
and, if the parties so agree, attempting to suggest or define the terms of a
mutually acceptable settlement. Like mediation, the report of a fact-finding body or conciliation commission is normally non-binding, although
the third party finding or recommendation may exercise an important influence on the settlement. A recent example of a successful use of a formal inquiry procedure is the 1961 "Red Crusader" inquiry into the facts
concerning the stopping by a Danish fishery protection vessel of a British
trawler off the Faroe Islands. A recent example of successful conciliation
is the special commission established by Norway and Iceland to make recommendations concerning their dispute over the apportionment of the
continental shelf off Jan Mayen Island; the Commission's Report, recommending joint development of hydrocarbon production, was implemented
by the conclusion of a 1981 Norway-Iceland Treaty on the matter.
Arbitration 9 involves the reference of a dispute or series of disputes,
by the agreement of the parties to an ad hoc tribunal for binding deci-

17. See, e.g., MERRILLS, supra note 1, at ch. 1; Darwin, Mediation and Good Offices, in
Waldock, supra note 1, at 83; Raman, supra note 1, at ch. 3. See generally, 0. YOUNG, THE
INTERMEDIARIES: THIRD PARTIES IN INTERNATIONAL CRISES (1967).
18. See, e.g., MERRILLS, supra note 1, at chs. 3 and 4; Fox, Conciliation, in Waldock,
supra note 1, at 159; BAR-YAACOV, THE HANDLING OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES BY MEANS OF
INQUIRY (1974); COT, INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION (1972); Firmage, Fact-Finding in the
Resolution of International Disputes: From the Hague Peace Conference to the United
Nations, 1971 UTAH L. REV. 421 (1971).
19. See, e.g., MERRILLS, supra note 1, at ch. 5; Fox, Arbitration, in Waldock, supra note
1, at 101; WETTER, THE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRAL PROCESS PUBLIC AND PRIVATE (1979); S.
SCHWEBEL, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: THREE SALIENT PROBLEMS (1987); SIMPSON AND Fox,
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (1959); Sohn, The Function of International Arbitration Today, 1 RECUEIL DES COURS 108 (1963); CARLSTON, THE PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (1946).
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sion, usually on the basis of international law. The parties by agreement
establish the issue to be arbitrated and the machinery and procedure of
the tribunal, including the method of selection of the arbitrator or arbitrators. While arbitration is normally binding, it is open to the parties to
provide that the tribunal's opinion will be only advisory. The 1978 U.S.French Air arbitration over a dispute concerning the interpretation of the
U.S.-French Air Agreement is a recent example of a successful
arbitration.
Judicial Settlement 0 involves the reference of the dispute, by the
agreement or consent of the parties, to the International Court of Justice
or some other standing and permanent judicial body for binding decision,
usually on the basis of international law. Again, if the rules establishing
the court so allow, the parties may agree to an advisory or nonbinding
opinion rather than a binding decision, or to a declaratory judgment specifying the principles which the parties should apply in the settlement of
their dispute. The Gulf of Maine case between the U.S. and Canada is a
recent example of successful judicial settlement under the procedures of
the I.C.J.
Another method is settlement through the United Nations or other
global or regional international organizations or agencies. 1 In some circumstances, the parties may request the assistance of the U.N., a regional
organization, or another international organization in settling their dispute, or the U.N. or another organization (for example, a regional organization) may on its own motion legitimately intervene in the dispute, at
least for the purposes of trying to bring about a peaceful settlement.
Sometimes a third party may ask for the organization's intervention. This
assistance may, inter alia, take the form of good offices, mediation, factfinding or conciliation. The rights and obligations of the parties and authority of each organization in these respects are in each case set out in
their respective Charters and other constitutive instruments, as well as
developed through their practice. The U.N.'s various attempts to deal

20. See, e.g., MERRLLS, supra note 1, at ch. 6; Bilder, InternationalDispute Settlement and the Role of InternationalAdjudication, supra note 1, Damrosch, supra note 14;
T. FRANCK, JUDGING THE WORLD COURT (1986); R. FALK, REVIVING THE WORLD COURT (1986);
Bilder, Some Limitations of Adjudication as an International Dispute Settlement Technique, 23 VA. J. INT'L L. 1 (1982); Allott, The InternationalCourt of Justice, in Waldock,
supra note 1, at 128; S. ROSENNE, THE WORLD COURT (3d ed. 1973); S. ROSENNE, THE LAW
AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT (1965); JENKS, THE PROSPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION (1964); the excellent collections of articles in THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE (L. Gross ed. 1976); and JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES (H. Mosler & R. Bernhardt eds. 1979); Schachter, supra note 1; Sohn,
supra note 1, and references cited infra note 33; and the many additional articles cited in
these works. For a listing and brief description of the various present international courts,
see Sohn, supra note 1, at 1127-30.
21. See MERRILLS, supra note 1, at chs. 8 and 9; Bowett, The United Nations and
Peaceful Settlement; Waldock, supra note 1, at 179; and Raman, supra note 1. Some international agreements empower the organizations established by them to render a binding
decision. See RESTATEMENT sec. 902, reporter's note 6, at 176. See also Sohn, supra note 1.
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with Middle Eastern, Iran-Iraq, and many other problems are familiar
examples of the attempted use of this technique.
The international system has developed a wide variety of institutions, arrangements, procedures and norms through which These kinds of
techniques can be invoked and implemented. These include over a hundred international organizations; international courts such as the I.C.J.,
the Court of the European Communities and the European and American
Courts of Human Rights; arbitral tribunals such as the U.S.-Iran Claims
Tribunal currently sitting in the Hague; GATT dispute-settlement.
panels; many binational commissions such as the Canada-U.S. International Joint Commission and so forth.
There are, of course, other sorts of distinctions that can usefully be
drawn. For example, two social psychologists, Dean Pruitt and Jeffrey
Rubin, suggest the following several broad contrasting types of thirdparty roles:22
- Formal vs. Informal Role. Is the third party intervening pursuant
to a formal understanding or legal precedents (i.e. under U.N. authorization or the "compromissory clause" of an agreement), or is the
intervention informal and without express legitimation?
- Individual vs. Representative Role. Is the intervenor acting in a
personal capacity, or in a representative capacity (i.e. as a government or international organization official)?
- Invited vs. Non-Invited Role. Is the intervenor acting pursuant to
an express or implied invitation or with the parties' consent, or on its
own or some other third party initiative (or conceivably against the
expressed wishes of one or both of the parties)?
- Impartialvs. PartialRole. Is the intervenor impartial or neutral, or
is it biased in favor of one party or a particular result?
- Advisory vs. Directive Role. Is the intervenor's role wholly or primarily advisory, with the aim of helping the parties achieve their own
solution, or can the intervenor determine all or part of the settlement
or outcome?
- Content-Orientedvs. Process-OrientedRoles. Does the intervenor's
role focus primarily on the actual content of the dispute (the issues
of substance under consideration), or primarily on the process of decision-making (the way in which the discussions are taking place)?
VII.

How

CAN THIRD PARTIES HELP

As indicated, in the case of advisory and non-binding techniques
such as good offices, mediation, fact-finding and conciliation, the third
party's role is usually limited to helping the parties to negotiate their own
settlement of their dispute. In contrast, in the case of directive and binding techniques such as arbitration and judicial settlement, responsibility
for settlement of all or part of the issues in dispute is removed from the

22. PRUITT AND RUBIN, supra note 1, at 166-69.
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parties' direct control and the third party is authorized to decide the matter for them. In each case, of course, the actual - or even potential - presence and activities of a third party may have various effects upon the
dynamics of the disputing process and the disputing parties'relationships,
some helpful, but some, perhaps not.
How can third parties help the disputants achieve a settlement themselves? A good deal of research has been done to identify the general
functions that mediators and other non-directive third parties can perform and the specific kinds of things they can do that are likely to be
most useful.
Pruitt and Rubin, for example, describe the type of negotiating impasse which may call for third-party assistance:
Positions tend towards rigidity because the protagonists are reluctant
to budge lest any conciliatory gesture be misconstrued as a sign of
weakness. Moreover, the parties may lack the imagination, creativity,
and/or experience necessary to work their way out of the pit they have
jointly engineered - not because they don't want to but because they
don't know how. Thus, for a variety of reasons, disputants are sometimes either unable or unwilling to move toward agreement of their
own accord. Under the circumstances, third parties often become involved at the behest of one or more of the disputants, or on their own
initiative.13
They suggest and discuss a variety of ways in which a third party can
help the parties break out of such an impasse.24 One way is by modifying
the physical and social structure of the dispute. For example, the third
party can structure communication between the principals; open and neutralize the site in which problem-solving takes place, impose time limits,
and infuse resources. Another way is by modifying the issue structure.
For example, the third party can assist the disputants to identify existing
issues and alternatives; help them to package and sequence issues in ways
that lead towards agreement; and introduce new issues and alternatives
that did not occur to the disputants themselves. Finally, the third party
can increase the disputant's motivation to reach agreement. For example,
it can facilitate their making concessions without loss of face, engender
mutual trust, encourage their venting and coming to grips with irrational
feelings, and respect their desire for autonomy.
Another commentator, Jacob Bercovich, divides third party aims into
process objectives and outcome objectives, each of which he in turn subdivides into two categories: (1) information search (i.e., establishing communication, searching for common principles) and, (2) social influence
(i.e., persuading the parties to converge on an acceptable outcome).
Bercovich sees third party behavior as implemented through certain tactics which he calls (1) reflective behavior (i.e., receiving, transmitting and

23. Id. at 165.
24. Id. at 169-79.
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interpreting messages and signals reflecting and influencing how the parties perceive their situation); (2) non-directive behavior (i.e., influencing
the context and structure of the conflict by controlling publicity, controlling the environment, controlling resources, reducing pressure and recasting issues); and (3) directive behavior (i.e., influencing the parties perceptions and motivation through making proposals, a judicious exercise of
power and promises of resources).2 5
Other commentators suggest other types of potential third-party contributions, or classify third-party objectives or functions in a somewhat.
different way. For example, Oran Young classifies third party objectives
as: (1) informational (i.e., offering information or increasing communication); (2) tactical (i.e., offering services); (3) supervisory (i.e., monitoring
an agreement); and (4) conceptual (i.e., offering new ideas for a settlement).2 6 Indeed, there is now a rich literature suggesting imaginative
techniques through which third parties may help parties in an impasse
"get unstuck" - for example, by creating a "hurting stalemate," providing "decommitting formulas" or "bypass solutions," "changing or refraining the game," using "single text procedures," and so forth. I have suggested elsewhere that a principal reason why disputing parties may not be
able to reach a settlement agreement is that they distrust each other or
are otherwise concerned with what they see as very serious risks potentially involved in such an agreement. In this case, third parties can play a
crucial role in dispute settlement by helping the parties in a variety of
ways to manage these risks - for example, by monitoring or verifying performance, serving as escrow agents, or providing guarantees.17 Third
party risk management devices of this kind may be particularly useful,
for example, in facilitating dispute-settlement arrangements in which distrust is a particularly serious obstacle, such as armistice or peace agreements or agreements seeking to resolve complex and emotional racial,
ethnic or religious conflicts.
What about more directive techniques of third party intervention
such as adjudication, in which third parties have authority themselves to
determine how the dispute is to be settled? While we will look at adjudication shortly, two of the most important ways in which this kind of third
party technique can help disputing parties can be briefly mentioned here.
First, adjudication can dispose of the matter. It is often more important to the parties that a dispute be settled than that it be settled in a
particular way. Where negotiations are unsuccessful, adjudication or
other third party disposition of the matter provides an alternative way in
which the parties can put the dispute behind them and move on to other
things.

25. BERCOVITCH, supra note 1, at ch. 5, esp. 96-108.
26. Young, supra note 1, and Young, Intermediaries: Additional Thoughts on Third
Parties,16 J. CONFLICT REsOLUTION 51 (1972).
27. See R. BILDER, MANAGING THE RISKS OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT (1981).
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Second, adjudication can permit concessions without "loss of face" or
bureaucratic risk. Since adjudication involves an impersonal decision by a
third party, neither of the governments of the parties (or the officials involved) can be held directly responsible for the outcome. There are probably a number of disputes where governments are relatively indifferent as
to the outcome and would normally be willing to negotiate a compromise
settlement, but where, for internal political or other reasons, they are unable to concede or even compromise the issue in negotiations. Third-party
settlement is a politically useful way by which foreign offices can dispose
of such problems without taking direct responsibility for concessions. In
effect, they can "pass the buck" for not "winning" the dispute to the
third-party tribunal - "Don't blame us, blame the judge!"
VIII.

WHICH TECHNIQUES WORK BEST?

A great deal of experience and writing exists concerning the relative
advantages and disadvantages of various techniques and when and how
each can best be employed.28 For example, J.G. Merrills, assessing the
value of conciliation as a dispute settlement technique, concludes:
Conciliation has proved most useful for disputes where the main issues are legal, but the parties desire an equitable compromise .... In
cases of this type, conciliation would appear to offer two advantages
over arbitration ex aequo et bono, the obvious alternative.
First, because of the way conciliation is conducted - through a dialogue with and between the parties-there is no danger of it producing a result that takes the parties completely by surprise, as sometimes happens in legal proceedings. Secondly a commissions'
proposals . . . are not binding and, if unacceptable can be rejected.29
Merrills and others have attempted similar types of assessments of other

techniques. Moreover, there is now a considerable body of theoretical and
empirical research, historical and political analysis, and biographical and
anecdotal reporting concerning such "how to do it" questions as the most
appropriate timing of intervention, characteristics of a third party, site
selection, the pros and cons of publicity in mediation, and so forth. In
this brief overview, however, only a few very broad generalizations can be
suggested.

First, different kinds of disputes will obviousely call for different
methods of settlement. The craft of effective dispute settlement involves
judging what method or combination of methods may be most useful in
helping to resolve the particular dispute and how and when such techniques can best be employed. Among the factors affecting such a choice

will be:
- the subject-matter and characteristics of the dispute (e.g., whether
28. See references in supra note 1. For excellent brief evaluations of various techniques
from an international lawyer's perspective, see MERRILLS, supra note 1.
29. Id. at 66.
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itinvolves a dispute about the facts, the law, at the law should be,
the terms of a particular allocation, or procedural issues);
- the nature of the relations between the parties, e.g., whether they
are "repeat players" having continuing relations with each other or
only infrequently have occasion to interact or deal with each other,
and whether there is generally friendship and trust or enmity and
distrust between them;
- the parties' perceptions and emotional attitudes as to the importance of the dispute (i.e., whether it is considered a matter of "vital
interest" or national prestige, or either party feels it "cannot afford'
to lose");
- the past history of this and other disputes between the parties (i.e.,
the "stage" of the dispute and extent to which positions have
changed or hardened, and precedents as to how the parties have handled such problems in the past);
- the potential effect of the dispute on other states or the international community (e.g., whether it is a matter potentially affecting
international peace and security) and the availability or willingness
to serve of appropriate third parties and the resources they are able
or willing to deploy.
Second, the various techniques are not mutually exclusive, nor are
the boundaries between them rigidly drawn. A number of them are usually employed either seriatim (although in no mixed order), or in combination to supplement or complement each other. For example, the recent
1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea and the 1988 Convention on
the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities, both of which
deploy a variety of techniques to deal with diverse types of disputes that
may arise, show how these possibilities can be exploited in an innovative
and imaginative way. As Professor Oscar Schachter has pointed out,
"Flexibility and adaptability to the particular circumstances are the essential characteristics of these various procedures. There is little to be
gained by seeking to give them precise legal limits or procedural rules as a
general matter."
Similarly, Judge Manfred Lachs, in his individual opinion in the 1978
Aegean Sea Continental Shelf case (Greece v. Turkey) commented:
There are obviously some disputes which can be resolved only by negotiations, because there is no alternative in view of the character of
the subject-matter involved and the measures envisaged. But there
are many other disputes in which a combination of methods would
facilitate their resolution. The frequently unorthodox nature of the
problems facing States today requires as many tools to be used and as
many avenues to be opened as possible, in order to resolve the intricate and frequently multi-dimensional issues involved. It is sometimes
desirable to apply several methods at the same time or successively.
Thus, no incompatibility should be seen between the various instru-

30.

SCHACHTER,

supra note 1, at 205.

DEN. J. INT'L

L. & POL'Y

VOL. 17:3

ments and fora to which States may resort, for all are mutually
complementary.31
Third, it is often useful to develop structured institutions and arrangements, such as international courts or fact-finding agencies, and to
have them in place, ready for use, and easily available if need should
arise. However, in other cases, it may be better to deal with problems as
they arise, on a pragmatic, flexible and ad hoc basis, rather than to try to
force dispute-management efforts onto the Procustean bed of some possibly unsuitable and inflexible already established dispute settlement
institution.
Fourth, the choice of techniques and the way they are employed
should, where relevant, take into account the particular dispute-settlement experience of the states involved. Every bilateral or other international relationship has its own unique character and environment which
shapes both the kinds of disputes that arise and how these particular
states tend to deal with them. Some states (i.e. Canada and the U.S.)
have developed special dispute management systems - a unique set of
practices, procedures, techniques and institutions - to deal with their particular quarrels.
Finally, a specific list of techniques will not exhaust the possibilities.
It will always be open to the disputing parties, or to third parties, to modify or adapt most of these techniques (except in the case of judicial settlement by an existing court with established rules), or to creatively develop
such additional methods as their needs and ingenuity suggest. Moreover,
since every dispute or conflict will be unique, generalizations such as
these, or particular "rules" or "formulas," should be applied with caution.

IX. THE ROLE OF ADJUDICATION
In view of current interest regarding the proper role of adjudication
as a method of international dispute settlement, particularly in the wake
of the World Court's decision in the Nicaragua case, some remarks on
this technique in particular may be appropriate. Again, it is not practical
to review here the very extensive literature analyzing the experience, procedures role and significance of international arbitral tribunals and
courts, and more particularly, the I.C.J 2 However, I would suggest the
following general points.
As is the case with respect to any method of dispute settlement, in
deciding whether to use adjudication, the parties to a dispute will weigh
its potential advantages against its disadvantages. 3 Among the potential

31. 1978 I.C.J. 52 (Dec. 19, 1978).
32. See, e.g., Bilder, InternationalDispute Settlement and the Role of Adjudication,
supra note 1, and other references supra notes 1 and 20.
33. For discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of adjudication and reasons
why states may be reluctant to accept adjudication and, in particular, the compulsory jurisdiction of the I.C.J, see, e.g., Bilder, International Dispute Settlement and the Role of
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advantages of adjudication, are: (i) it is dispositive, ideally, at least putting an end to the dispute; (ii) it is impersonal, permitting the parties to
pass responsibility for unfavorable outcomes to the tribunal; (iii) it is
principled and impartial, ostensibly deciding the matter by neutral principles rather than power, bias or whim; (iv) it is serious and demonstrates
that the state instituting suit really believes in its claim; (v) it is orderly
and can be useful in resolving complex factual and technical disputes; (vi)
it can sometimes "depoliticize" a dispute, reducing tensions or buying
time; (vii) it can provide rules socially useful for guiding conduct and
resolving disputes more broadly; (viii) it can reflect, and educate the com-'

Adjudication, supra note 1, at 144-65; T. FRANCK, supra note 20; SCHACHTER, supra note 1,
at 207-11; Vallat, Foreword in Waldock, supra note 1; MERRILLS, supra note 1, at 107-13; M.
NORTHEDGE & DONELON, supra note 1, at 321-29; Gross, Role of InternationalAdjudication,
and Rovine, The National Interest and the World Court; Hudec, Transcending the Ostensible: Some Reflections on the Nature of Litigation Between Governments, 72 MINN. L.
REV. (1987); Higgins, The Desirabilityof Third Party Adjudication: Conventional Wisdom
or Continuing Truth?, in INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION: LAW IN MOVEMENT 37 (J. Fawcett &
R. Higgins eds. 1974); Lachs, A Few Thoughts on the Independence of Judges of the International Court of Justice, 25 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 593 (1987); Owen, Compulsory Jurisdiction of the InternationalCourt of Justice:A Study of Its Acceptance by Nations, 3 GA.
L. REV. 704 (1969); Shihata, The Attitude of New States Toward the InternationalCourt of
Justice 19 INT'L. ORG. 203 (1965); J. GAMBLE & D. FISHER, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF
JUSTICE (1975); Dalfen, The World Court in Idle Splendour: The Basis of State Attitudes,
23 INT'L J. 124 (1967); Brauer, International Conflict Resolution: The ICJ Chambers and
the Gulf of Maine Dispute, 23 VA. J. INT'L L. 463, 468-73 (1983); De Visacher, Reflections
on the Present Prospects of InternationalAdjudication, 50 AM. J. INT'L L. 467 (1956); E.
MCWHINNEY, THE WORLD COURT AND THE CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW-MAKING PRO-

CESS (1979); Falk, The Role of the InternationalCourt of Justice, 37 J. INT'L AFF. 253
(1984); R. FALK, REVIVING THE WORLD COURT (1986); W. JENKS, THE PROSPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION (1964); and generally other sources cited supra notes 1 and 20. As
indicated, explanations of why states are generally reluctant to agree to adjudicative or "legal" techniques of dispute settlement often emphasize states' lack of confidence in the predictability of such procedures and their concern over their loss of control over outcomes.
See, e.g., D. Bowett, supra note 1, at 180-81:
[While] specific reasons change from State to State, the basic reason for avoiding legal settlement is simply that States prefer to retain control over the settlement process, so as to ensure that any settlement is acceptable to them, or,
if that cannot be achieved, that no settlement is reached. With the political
techniques they retain such control - though this is less true when the pressures of United Nations organs are brought to bear - whereas with legal techniques States evidently feel that they lose control.
Some commentators suggest a distinction between so-called "legal" or "justiciable" disputes,
on the one hand, and "political," "non-legal" or "non-justiciable" disputes, on the other; the
implication is that some disputes have inherent characteristics that make them either particularly appropriate or inappropriate for the use of adjudication as a dispute settlement
technique. Others, with whom I agree, are of the view that, while state attitudes towards
accepting the risks of adjudication and the usefulness of adjudication will obviously differ in
different circumstances, in principle all international disputes are "justiciable." See, An
Overview of InternationalDispute Settlement, supra note 1, at 15-17. For discussion, see,
e.g., SCHACHTER, supra note 1, at 211-15 and Schachter, Compulsory Jurisdiction in Cases
Involving the Use of Force, in Damrosch, supra note 14; Henkin, supra note 1, at 829-31;
Darwin, General Introduction in Waldock, supra note 1, at 6-13; RESTATEMENT, supra note
1, sec. 903, reporter's note 7;J. GAMBLE & R. FISCHER, supra note 1, at 20.
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munity as to social values and interests of the international community
more broadly, apart from those of the parties alone, and; (ix) it can be
system-re-enforcing, supporting respect for and the development of international law.
But, there are also a number of potential disadvantages of adjudication: (i) it involves the possibility of losing; (ii) adjudicative settlement
may be illusory or superficial, deciding the "legal" but not the "real" issues in dispute; (iii) it can be inflexible, resulting in a "win-lose" rather
than a compromise decision; (iv) it can be judgmental, labeling one party
as a "lawbreaker," rather than providing for a shared acceptance of responsibility as a facesaving way out of a conflictual situation; (v) it looks
primarily to the past rather than to the future, possibly jeopardizing the
maintenance of a useful ongoing relationship; (vi) it is conservative; (vii)
its results are unpredictable; (viii) it may not be impartial; (ix) an adjudicative settlement is imposed on the parties; (x) it is adversarial and may
escalate the dispute or conflict; (xi) it may freeze the parties' options and
discourage settlement; (xii) it can be complex and costly, and; (xiii) there
is no assurance that an adjudicative decision will be enforceable.
As previously noted, adjudication has generally played only a rather
limited role in the settlement of international disputes. While nations
often pay lip-service to the ideal of judicial settlement, in practice they
have entrusted relatively few significant disputes to international tribunals. During the period of 1946 through 1985, the International Court of
Justice had only 72 cases submitted to it; it rendered 45 judgements in
contentions cases and 17 advisory opinions. Moreover, countries have
been particularly reluctant to obligate themselves in advance to compulsory binding adjudication of their potential disputes with other countries-particularly disputes concerning issues that may involve what they
consider "vital" national interests. In general, they have been willing to
do so, at most, only when their commitment to such compulsory jurisdiction is restricted in terms of subject matter or otherwise carefully
circumscribed.
In my opinion, this reluctance of states to submit disputes to arbitral
or judicial settlement will continue for some time to come. Thus, for the
near future at least, the prospects for widespread acceptance of the general compulsory jurisdiction of the I.C.J. under the Optional Clause of
Article 36(2) of the Court's Statute do not seem to me bright." In partic-

34. By 1988, only 46 of the 159 members of the U.N. had declarations in effect accepting the Court's compulsory jurisdiction under the optional clause. For comprehensive
reviews and analysis of experience respecting the I.C.J.'s compulsory jurisdiction (the socalled "optional clause" of Article 36(2) of the I.C.J. Statute), see, e.g., Damrosch, supra
note 14; Gross, Compulsory JurisdictionUnder the Optional Clause: History and Practice,
in DAMROSCH, supra note 14, at 19; Merrills, The Optional Clause Today, 1979 BRIT.
Y.B.I.L. 87 (1979); Giustini, Compulsory Adjudication in InternationalLaw: The Past, the
Present and Prospects for the Future, 9 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 213 (1985-86); Scott and Carr,
The InternationalCourt of Justice and Compulsory Jurisdiction:The Case for Closing the
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ular, I believe that, in the aftermath of the Nicaraguacase, it is unlikely
that the U.S. will soon resume its acceptance of the optional clause, except possibly with very broad reservations-although it is my personal
belief that it is in our national interest to do so."
While adjudication may not be the best way of resolving every dispute, there are clearly a number of situations in which adjudication, or at
least the availability of adjudication, can perform a very useful dispute
settlement function. In practice, most disputes do not involve issues of
significant or "vital" national concerns. In these cases, while each party
may prefer to win the dispute, the stakes involved are limited and each
can afford to lose. Adjudication is one good way in which the parties can
achieve their most important objective in these situations - disposing of
the dispute. Indeed, to the extent that states can be assured that a commitment to adjudication will be restricted to less vital issues, they will be
more willing to agree, even in advance, to adjudication. Thus, nations
have frequently been willing to agree to compromissory clauses providing
in advance for compulsory jurisdiction over disputes arising out of treaties concerned with specialized matters of clearly defined scope and limited import, such as commercial treaties. The U.S. for example, is party

Clause, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 57 (1987). On the Court's jurisdiction under "compromissory
clauses," see, e.g., Charney, Compromissory Clauses and the Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 855 (1987). Morrison, Treaties as a Source of
Jurisdiction,Especially in U.S. Practice, in DAMROSCH, supra note 14, at 58.
35. For recent discussions of U.S. attitudes regarding international adjudication and
the Court's compulsory jurisdiction, see in particular Panel Discussion, Current Developments Concerning the Settlement of Disputes by Arbitration and the World Court, 83rd
Annual Mtg. of Am. Soc. of Int'l L. (Chicago) (April 5-8, 1989) to be printed in 1989 PROC.
AM. Soc. INT'L. L. _; DAMROSCH, supra note 14; T. FRANCK, supra note 20; Symposium, 81
AM. J. INTL. L. 1 (1987). Suggestions have been made for various types of reservations to
meet the Administration's concerns and permit resumed U.S. acceptance of the compulsory
jurisdiction of the I.C.J. They include reservations excluding from the jurisdiction of the
Court matters involving national security or the use of force or matters referred to other
dispute-resolution procedures or matters under consideration by the U.N. Security Council;
excluding jurisdiction when the applicant party's declaration of acceptance of the Court's
compulsory jurisdiction was made for the purpose of filing the individual suit; and providing
for the possibility of denunciation of the U.S. acceptance with immediate effect. Suggestions
have also been made for modification or elimination of certain U.S. reservations in its 1946
declaration of acceptance, particularly the multilateral treaty (Vandenberg) reservation and
the "self-judging" domestic jurisdiction (Connally) reservation. See, e.g., Damrosch, supra
note 14; Sohn, Suggestions for the Limited Acceptance of Compulsory Jurisdictionof the
International Court of Justice by the United States, 18 GA. J. INT'L & Comp. L. 1 (1988);
D'Amato, Modifying U.S. Acceptance of the Compulsory Jurisdictionof the World Court,
79 AM. J. INT'L L. 385 (1985); D'Amato, The United States Should Accept, by a New Declaration, the General Compulsory Jurisdiction of the World Court, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 331
(1986); Gardner, U.S. Termination of the Compulsory Jurisdiction of the International
Court of Justice, 24 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 421 (1986); Morrison, Reconsidering United
States Acceptance of the Compulsory Jurisdiction of the InternationalCourt of Justice,
148 WORLD AFF. 63 (1985); Ende, Comment, Reaccepting the Compulsory Jurisdictionof
the International Court of Justice: A Proposalfor a New United States Declaration, 61
WASH. L. REV. 1145 (1986).
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to more than 60 bilateral and multilateral agreements containing such
"compromissory clauses."
Among the types of diisputes in which adjudication is likely to be particularly useful are: (a) disputes in which governments are indifferent to
outcome, but for internal political or other reasons are unable to concede
or even compromise the issue in negotiations (i.e., minor boundary disputes or substantively unimportant but emotionally volatile issues of title
to small or insignificant areas of territory); (b) disputes involving difficult
factual or technical questions in which the parties may be prepared for a
compromise solution but where, either because of the complexity of the
situation or internal political pressures, they cannot evolve a basis for developing a viable compromise (i.e., again certain complex boundary or
maritime, continental shelf, or fishery resource zone delimitation issues);
and (c) some particularly awkward or dangerous disputes, in which resort
to judicial settlement may be a politically acceptable way of buying time
and containing a volatile situation while solutions are sought over time.
Moreover, international tribunals, simply by being available, may
help avoid, or induce the settlement of, disputes. Even if states choose
only infrequently to invoke the International Court's jurisdiction under
the Optional Clause or "compromissory clauses" in relevant agreements,
that does not mean such commitments are useless. On the contrary, since
each party to a dispute covered by such provisions knows that the other
can resort to the Court, a party that wishes to avoid adjudication will
have more incentive to reach a negotiated settlement. That is, where the
parties have conferred potential jurisdiction on an international tribunal,
their decisions and bargaining, like those of parties to domestic disputes,
will be more likely to occur "in the shadow of the law." J.G. Merrills
comments:
[T]he value of arrangements for dispute settlement is not to be judged
solely by the cases. For a provision for compulsory arbitration by its
very existence can discourage unreasonable behaviour and so may be
3
useful even if it is never invoked. 1
It is also important to note that, for many people throughout the
36. MERRILLS, supra note 1, at 88. In this context, it is amusing to compare an ancient
Chinese suggestion that a good way to encourage dispute-settlement by the parties themselves is to provide only very bad courts. The 7th century Emperor K'ang Hsi is reported to
have said:
Law suits would tend to increase to a frightful amount, if people were not
afraid of the tribunals, and if they felt confident of always finding in them
ready and perfect justice. As man is apt to delude himself concerning his own
interests, contests would then be interminable, and the half of the Empire
would not suffice to settle the lawsuits of the other half. I desire, therefore,
that those who have recourse to the tribunals should be treated without any
pity, and in such a manner that they shall be disgusted with law, and tremble
to appear before a magistrate.
R. DAVID & J.E.C. BRIERLEY, MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS IN THE WORLD TODAY 520 (1978), citing
S.

VAN DE SPRENKEL, LEGAL INSTITUTIONS IN MANCHU CHINA

77 (1962).
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world, international adjudication symbolizes civilized and ordered behavior and the rule of law in international affairs. Whatever the truth may be
as to how the international legal system actually works, public judgments
as to the relevance and effectiveness of international law are at least in
part based on whether the public sees international courts, and particularly the International Court of Justice, as playing a significant role in
international dispute settlement. If many states (particularly the important ones) are willing to submit their disputes to impartial settlement and
show respect for the International Court, this will be taken by the public
as meaning that international law is in itself relevant and worthy of respect, and the public will believe in and support international law. If, on
the other hand, important states show indifference or contempt for international adjudication and the Court, the public is likely to conclude that
international law is meaningless and withdraw their belief and support.
Indeed, these public attitudes may in turn over time reflect back on official and bureaucratic attitudes towards and respect for international law.
Consequently, if a state believes that its national interest will be furthered by wider global respect for international law, it will arguably also
have an interest in doing what it can to strengthen and support the role
of international adjudication.
Finally, even if the role of international adjudication is limited and
there is no international court with general compulsory jurisdiction, there
can still be effective dispute settlement and a workable international legal
order. The international legal order is different in many respects from
national legal orders, and need not operate in exactly the same way."7
Moreover, we are coming to realize that, even in the domestic legal system, adjudication plays a largely supplementary or "back up" role, and
that much of the work national courts do is in effect mediation or
conciliation. 8
In sum, since adjudication can be a particularly useful tool in our
tool-box of dispute settlement techniques, it is important that it be kept
ready at hand, easily available and employed to the fullest whenever its
use is warranted. Even if adjudication is not a panacea for problems of
world order, it makes sense to do all that we can to strengthen and encourage the greater use of judicial institutions, and to improve their ability to respond in flexible ways to nations' dispute settlement needs.
It is relevant in this respect to note that the Soviet Union's recent
apparent change of attitude and new receptiveness towards the compulsory jurisdiction of the World Court, and towards multilateral conflict
resolution techniques more generally, at least as stated in Premier

37. See discussion in Bilder, InternationalDispute Settlement and the Role of Adjudication, supra note 1; Allott, in Waldock, supra note 1, at 128-32; Schachter, supra note 1,
at ch. III and 207-11.
38. See, e.g., references on dispute processing in the U.S. cited in supra note 1, and,
particularly, Galanter, supra note 1.
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Gorbachev's September, 1987 Pravda articles,"9 may represent a unique
"window of opportunity" for strengthening international dispute-management institutions, which the U.S. and other western nations ought seriously to explore.
X.

SOME LIMITATIONS OF THIRD PARTY DISPUTE SETTLEMENT

While third-party intervention is usually helpful and undertaken for
benevolent motives, this may not always be the case. There are some potential drawbacks of third party dispute settlement. 0
Even well-meaning intervention may get in the way of or discourage
the parties' own settlement efforts, making things worse rather than better. This may be true in particular where the intervention is premature or
inept, or where the third party is an "officious intermeddler," butting into
a situation without invitation and against the parties wishes. But even if
intervention is invited, it may be the case that "too many cooks may spoil
the soup" or that things somehow go wrong.
Third party intervention will not necessarily produce a fair or stable
settlement or outcome. Even where third party intervention is ostensibly
"neutral," it may often have the effect of supporting the position and interests of one or another of the parties. Moreover, to the extent intervention by third parties typically produces outcomes differing from those
which would have resulted from negotiations based on the effective power
of the disputing states acting solely by themselves,the outcomes and "settlements" resulting from intervention may distort rather than reflect real
underlying power relationships and be unstable. Indeed, where third parties artificially constrain real pressures, the result may be that over time
"the boiler will explode" or "the toothpaste squeeze out of the tube somewhere else," producing even greater problems in the future.
As a corollary to the previous point, the possibility of third party
intervention may sometimes lead to or prolong disputes and conflicts by
encouraging parties (particularly weaker parties) to be more aggressive or
intransigent than they would otherwise normally dare to be. For example,
it has been suggested that the Arab states have little reason to refrain
from hostile actions against Israel, or to reach a definitive settlement with

39. Mikhail Gorbachev, The Realities and Guarantees of a Secure World, Pravda,
Sept. 17, 1987; USSR Mission to the UN, Press Release No. 119 (Sept. 17, 1987), suggesting,
inter alia, that the International Court's "mandatory jurisdiction should be recognized by
all on mutually agreed conditions," that "the permanent members of the Security Council,
taking into account their special responsibility, are to make the first step in that direction,"
and that "the international community should encourage the United Nations Secretary
General in his missions of good offices, mediation and reconciliation" (at 11-12). See also,
e.g., the Soviet Union's announcement on March 8, 1989, that it would accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice with respect to disputes concerning
five international human rights treaties, N.Y. Times, March 9, 1989, at 1, col. 4; see also
Lewis, Moscow Says World Court can Decide Soviet Disputes, N.Y. Times, Nov. 3, 1988, at
4, col. 7.
40. See also PRUITT AND RUBIN, supra note 1, at 179-82.
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it, so long as they believe from experience that any severe Israeli sanctions or retaliation will always be nullified by U.N. or other third party
intervention.
Third party intervention - or even its possibility in the future - can
hinder or chill negotiations by encouraging an exaggeration or freezing of
the parties' positions. Each will be aware of the tendency of mediators
(and even arbitrators and judges) to "split the difference" and seek a
compromise; consequently, rather than focusing on settling the matter
themselves, they may seek to put themselves in the best position to "win"
any third party intervention.
In trying to help resolve a dispute or conflict, third parties can become enmeshed in it, thus widening, complicating and prolonging the dispute. For example, one or another of the disputants may come to perceive
the third party as really an ally or an enemy; persuade, coerce or trick it
into "taking sides;" or "blackmail" it into a continuing role in the dispute. In this event, the third party may become part of the problem
rather than its solution.
Finally, third parties will often have their own interests at stake in
intervening in a conflict or dispute, which may distort their settlement
efforts or cause them to seek outcomes not in accord with the parties
desires or interests. Indeed, sometimes a third party may have a mischievous or malevolent purpose, seeking to prevent the conflict or dispute
from being resolved or to "keep the pot boiling" to suit the third party's
own purposes.
XI.

How

IMPORTANT

Is

THIRD PARTY

DisPuTE

SETTLEMENT AND DOES

IT REALLY WORK?

It is difficult to measure precisely and objectively either the practical
significance or success of third party dispute settlement. Clearly, any such
judgments will vary with the situation under examination and the perspective of the observer. Moreover, in assessing importance or success, we
may have to answer the question "as compared to what?" However, we
can probably say at least a few things.
As indicated, most disputes are - and should be - settled through
direct negotiations. Thus, third party intervention will usually be less important, effective or efficient than settlement directly by the parties
themselves.
However, while precise data is lacking, recent studies suggest that
third party intervention in international conflicts often can play a significant role - a result in accord with long human experience and intuition.
In particular, there is evidence that, while third party intervention does
not always provide a final settlement to a conflict or dispute, it often
seems to keep things from getting worse. For example, Bercovitch, analyzing data involving 310 conflicts from 1945-74, found that in 235 of
these conflicts, or 82 percent of the total, there was some form of official
third-party intervention, primarily by the U.N. and in the form of media-
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tion, and that it was useful in at lest abating conflict in a substantial
number of these situations.' He concludes that third party intervention
seems to be an important method for managing international conflict, and
that:
[S]tudies show that institutional third parties can be particularly useful in abating, insulating and restraining international conflict, though
not in settling it. We do not know, however, whether conflicts in
which the parties accept the intervention of an outsider are more, or
less, likely to terminate in a settlement. Nor do we know whether a
better, or even a similar outcome could not have been attained and
without the participation of a third party. Until we have some answers
to these questions, third parties' contributions to successful outcomes
should be kept in their proper, and critical, perspective."'
Similarly, Pruitt and Rubin conclude that: "In the last analysis, however,
it is our view that third parties are enormously
helpful and important in
3
the reduction and resolution of differences.'

Certainly, there is much to be said for techniques which stop the parties from fighting and keep them talking, even if a definitive solution
proves for the moment elusive. Sometimes, if matters can just be put "on
hold," time and changing attitudes, interests and circumstances may provide opportunities for settlement not presently apparent.
It is usually assumed, probably correctly, that third party intervention is much more widely used in relatively "unimportant" than "important" types of disputes. But it is also evident that third parties do, at
least occasionally, help parties resolve "important" disputes. If third
party intervention is in fact useful in resolving a number of less important and even a few important disputes, it would certainly seem to be
performing a significant function, even if it cannot help in all disputes.
Finally, regarding adjudication, it seems fair to conclude that despite
the relatively small number of these cases - perhaps in all only several
hundred intergovernmental arbitrations and less than 85 contentious
cases in the World Court (33 in the P.C.I.J. and some 50 in the I.C.J.),
many of these cases have involved disputes of considerable significance.
Among these important cases are the Alabama Claims, Bering Sea,
North Atlantic Fisheries,Lake Lanoux, Island of Palmas, Trail Smelter,
Rann of Kutch, Channel Islands and Beagle Channel arbitrations, and
the Gulf of Maine, North Sea Continental Shelf and Iranian Hostage
cases. Moreover, these decisions have helped to establish principles and
rules which have helped resolve or avoid other international disputes.

41. BERCOVITCH, supra note 1, at 92-93 and 113-15 (using data from Butterworth).
42. Id. at 113-15.
43. Pruitt and Rubin, supra note 1, at 179. For a discussion of the role of third-party
dispute settlement techniques in helping nations to manage the risks of their international
cooperation and reach international agreements, see Bilder, supra note 27, at 56-61.
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XII.

SOME CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS

What is the proper role of third party techniques in managing international disputes and what can we do to improve their usefulness? In
summary, the following are some of my suggestions.
First, we should recognize that the best way of dealing with international disputes is by negotiations between the parties themselves, and the
most important and useful thing third parties usually can do will be to
supplement and assist this process. Consequently, our efforts should be
directed particularly to improving facilitative techniques such as mediation, fact-finding and conciliation. Certainly, we should also encourage
the use of more directive techniques such as adjudication, but with
awareness that arbitration and judicial settlement are likely to play only
a limited role in international dispute settlement for some time to come.
Second, while third party techniques will often be useful, we should
not expect more than they can deliver. For example, even the most skilled
use of third party techniques usually will not succeed in bringing unwilling parties, who have fundamental differences, to agreement. However,
we should also remember that third party intervention can be useful and
"successful" simply by restraining or isolating conflict, buying time, or
keeping a situation from getting worse, even if it does not bring about a
final settlement.
Third, while we should certainly continue to learn more about various methods of third-party intervention, such as mediation, and improve
our ability to use them effectively, we should be careful not to overemphasize the importance of mere technique or "gimmicks." There are few
secrets and little magic in successful dispute settlement. The most important factor will continue to be whether the parties want - or can be persuaded to want - the dispute settled. The most important qualities of a
third party will continue to be traditional "old-fashioned" virtues - common sense, honesty, trustworthiness, patience, integrity, stamina, courage,
intelligence, competence, sensitivity to the concerns of others, conscientiousness, impartiality and good will. And luck will always help.
Fourth, we should try to better understand and develop disputemanagement systems between or among particular states or groups of
states." Dispute settlement is a complex process, in which a variety of
techniques may appropriately play a part. Each international relationship
exists in a unique environment, and may require its own special approach
or "mix." Thus, the U.S. and Canada historically have developed and
may be able most appropriately to use one type of dispute-management
system, while U.S.-Soviet relationships may most appropriately call for a
completely different kind of system.
Fifth, in thinking about dispute settlement, we should not forget the
great importance of doing more to avoid disputes. Thus, we should de44. See Bilder, supra note 9.
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velop and improve arrangements and mechanisms designed both to keep
disputes from occurring and to permit them to be dealt with at an early
stage, before political interests become vested, emotions become involved,
or positions harden." Such dispute avoidance measures might include
prior agreement on clear rules and workable arrangements; prior notification and consultation, and the establishment of ad hoc or permanent
binational commissions or joint agencies.
Sixth, we should be sensitive to the possible relevance to any dispute
of the particular cultural attitudes and responses towards conflict and
dispute-settlement of the parties involved, and take such perspectives
into account in deciding on the appropriateness of different approaches or
techniques. For example, Chinese, Japanese and certain other non-Western societies appear traditionally to have given particular emphasis to
nonadversarial techniques of mediation and mutual accommodation as a
way of dealing with disputes, and to have been particularly reluctant to
use adjudication or other adversarial or "legally-oriented" methods.
Again, different societies may have different perspectives regarding the
types of individuals most worthy of respect and trust and most suitable to
perform third-party roles; thus, in some cultures, eminent lawyers may be
appropriate mediators or dispute resolvers, while in others, political or
religious leaders may be more suitable.
Seventh, we should study possibilities for improving old third party
institutions and procedures and developing new ones. Clearly, there is
much to be said for having institutions or procedures in place, more easily
available to parties if they wish to use them - although it is open to
question whether new institutions in themselves will make much difference without some change in underlying state attitudes. Certainly, one of
the most important things we can do is to foster an international atmosphere in which third-party intervention and efforts to promote peaceful
settlement of disputes are considered routine,appropriate, legitimate and
acceptable. There are several ideas worth exploring regarding improvements to be made and possible new developments in our dispute management institutions.
One idea is to expand the availability and use of non-binding conciliation processes and of the advisory jurisdiction of international tribunals.
As indicated, governments have been reluctant to accept binding judicial
settlement since they see legally binding judgments as posing special risks
- even though their fears may be unrealistic and unlikely to come to
pass. Conciliation and advisory or non-binding adjudication, on the other
hand, can offer many advantages of impartial third-party factual and legal determination while reducing some of its most significant risks. In
many cases, a recommendation or advisory decision may in fact provide a

45. See, e.g., Bilder, An Overview of InternationalDispute Settlement, supra note 1,

at 29-31; R.
TICE (1983).
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mutually acceptable basis for resolution of the dispute; however, each
party will have the assurance that, should its worst fears be realized and
the decision prove unacceptable, it can legally refuse to comply with it,
incurring only limited public relations costs. While binding adjudication
may in principle be preferable, non-binding conciliation or adjudication
may in some situations be the most that one or both parties will agree to,
and in that event, better than nothing. The thus far successful experience
of the newly formed Inter-American Court of Human Rights with advisory jurisdiction is suggestive in this respect."
Another idea is to develop a wider, more easily available, and more
credible array of international fact-finding, monitoring and verification
facilities. For example, proposals have been made in 'the U.N. for the development of permanent fact-finding institutions, and even for the establishment of International Satellite Monitoring Agency to help verify arms
control or similar agreements. I have elsewhere suggested the possibility
of establishing an essentially independent and neutral entity (e.g., a "Facility for International Risk Management") outside the U.N. framework
and free of direct government control, which would be available to states,
at their request and with their sharing of costs, to perform verification,
monitoring, escrow or other risk-management functions; such a facility
might take, for example, the form of an international corporation, along
the lines of EUROCHEMIC, or a nongovernmental organization, such as
the International Committee of the Red Cross.4 7
Still another possibility is to explore ways of making international
adjudication, and in particular the I.C.J., more acceptable, accessible and
flexible." As indicated, any substantial change in the willingness of
state's to use international adjudication or the I.C.J. is likely to require a
fundamental change in state attitudes and in their willingness to face the

46. See, e.g., Buergenthal, The Advisory Practice of the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1985). See generally, for arguments for more pragmatic, flexible and non-binding types of risk-management and dispute-resolution arrange-

ments, R. BILDER, MANAGING THE RISKS OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT (1981).
47. See Bilder, An Institution to Monitor Treaties, 18 INT'L PRAC. NOTEBOOK 13 (Apr.
1982) (Amer. Branch, Int'l Law Assoc.) and Milwaukee Journal Mar. 14, 1982, at part 9. On
verification, see generally, Bilder, supra note 46, at 119-39; Trimble, Beyond Verification:
The Next Step in Arms Control, 102 HARv. L. REV. 885 (1989); M. KREPON, ARMS CONTROL
- VERIFICATION AND COMPLIANCE (1987); W. POLLER (ed.), VERIFICATION AND ARMS CONTROL
(1985).
48. For recent discussions of the I.C.J. and suggestions for broadening its role, see the
references cited in supra notes 1, 20, and 33, and also Allott, supra note 1, at 134-58; Gross,

supra note 1; Gross, The InternationalCourt of Justice: Consideration of Requirements for
Enhancing its Role in the InternationalLegal Order, 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 253 (1971); Sohn,
supra note 1; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, STUDY ON WIDENING ACCESS TO THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE (1976), reprinted in DIGEST OF U.S. PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 650 (Mcdowell ed. 1976); Murphy, The World Court and the Peaceful Settlement of
InternationalDisputes, 7 GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 551 (1977); Dillard, The World Court:
Reflections of a Professor Turned Judge, 27 AM. U.L. REV. 205 (1978); Petren, Some
Thoughts on the Future of the International Court of Justice, 6 NETH. Y.B.INT'L.L. 59
(1975).
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risks inherent in binding third-party dispute settlement techniques. But
some procedural innovations may be of help. For example, the recent expansion of the availability and use of the I.C.J.'s chamber procedure is
one useful step in this direction.49 Professor Louis Sohn's proposal for
step-by-step acceptance of the Court's compulsory jurisdiction - the
idea of slicing or fractionating types or degrees of commitment to adjudication into less-risky and more-acceptable packages - is another suggestive and innovative type of approach."0 Another idea is that the U.S. consider entering into special dispute settlement agreements with the Soviet
Union and perhaps other major powers outside the Article 36(2) "optional clause" framework - providing for the compulsory submission of
carefully specified types of treaty or other disputes to special chambers of
the International Court of Justice. Among the various other suggestions
which have been made and debated are: permitting wider access to the
I.C.J. or other international courts by international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, or even individuals; restricting the types of
reservations which can be made to acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the I.C.J. under the "optional clause"; completely discarding the
concept of compulsory jurisdiction; expanding the "law" the I.C.J. can
draw on under Article 38 of its statute to include U.N. General Assembly
declarations; and so forth. We might consider whether at least some of
the so-called "alternative dispute resolution" (ADR) techniques, such as
"minitrials," currently being discussed and experimented with within the
U.S. and some other national legal systems, have possible application to
international problems and are worth exploring.
We should also try to strengthen the ability of third parties in appropriate situations to intervene on a temporary basis in disputes and conflicts simply to keep matters "on hold" and from getting worse, while providing time or a "waiting period" in which the disputing states or third
parties can seek solutions. Precedents include the power of the I.C.J.,
under Article 41 of its statute, to indicate, if it considers that circumstances so require, any provisional measures which ought to be taken to
preserve the respective rights of either party, as well as the activities of

49. See, e.g., Schwebel, Ad Hoc Chambers of the InternationalCourt of Justice, 81 AM.
J. INT'L L. 831 (1987). Most of the cases submitted to the Court since 1982 have been under
the chamber procedure. There are indications that the State Department strongly favors use
of the chamber procedure and, indeed, may contemplate that future submissions to the
Court be only to such a panel. See 1989 PRoc. AM. Soc. INT'L. L., supra note 35. Certainly
the panel concept has proven popular, and it is arguable that any device which encourages a
willingness by states to resort to the Court is for the good. On the other hand, there may be
some question whether, if all states choose to use only such specially selected panels, the
International Court of Justice will remain in fact a "World Court", rather than simply being
a series of ad hoc arbitral tribunals sitting at a common seat. That is, to the extent that the
extensive use of the chambers procedure tends to erode the concept and integrity of the
Court as a global institution, or encourages the attitude that its international judges are
inherently biased or untrustworthy, there may be serious reason for concern.
50. Sohn, Step-by-Step Acceptance of the Jurisdictionof the International Court of
Justice, 58 A.S.I.L. PRoc. 131 (1964).
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various U.N. peacekeeping forces. We should explore whether there might
be additional ways of temporarily restraining and preventing escalation of
disputes to permit time and opportunity for settlement.
Also, we should attempt to develop ways of better utilizing national
legal systems to implement international dispute-management objectives
should be developed. Proposals to allow the I.C.J. to give advisory opinions to national courts on questions of international law would be one
interesting step in this direction.5 1 Other possibilities might include
agreements facilitating access to national courts or agencies by alien individuals, corporations or even foreign governments seeking domestic remedies for particular kinds of transnational problems, such as transfrontier
pollution disputes; or an agreement, similar to the N.Y. Arbitration Convention, expressly providing for implementation by a respondent state
and third states of the obligation of states under the U.N. Charter to
comply with a judgment of the I.C.J.
Eighth, we should give more emphasis and support to innovative research about the international dispute process and techniques of international dispute management and settlement, particularly empirical and interdisciplinary studies. 2 This research should include investigations of
the broad underlying questions concerning the causes, characteristics, and
"life cycle" of disputes noted at the beginning of this paper. Particular
questions relevant to third party dispute-settlement which might merit
more attention and additional research including the following:
- What factors influence disputing states' perceptions of the acceptability, authority, and persuasiveness of third parties? What qualities
really are most important? In particular, what do we mean by "neutrality," "impartiality" or "lack of bias," how important are perceptions as to the neutrality of third parties to the success of their efforts, and how can we best ensure that third parties are in fact
neutral and unbiased? Even though every human being, inevitably,
may have biases, can't people still be counted on to conscientiously
perform roles which require them to act "neutrally," and how can we
strengthen such traditions? What are the pros and cons of utilizing
51. See, e.g., Schwebel, PreliminaryRulings by the InternationalCourt of Justice at
the Instance of National Courts, 28 VA. J. INT'L L. 495 (1988); Gross, supra note 48 ; Sohn,
Broadening the Advisory Jurisdictionof the InternationalCourt of Justice, 77 AM. J. INT'L
L. 124 (1983); Goldklang, House Approves Proposal Permitting ICJ to Advise Domestic
Courts, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 338 (1983); McLaughlin, Allowing Federal Courts Access to International Court of Justice Advisory Opinions: Critique and Proposal, 6 HASTINGS INT'L &
COMP. L. REV. 745 (1983).
52. For listings of academic and other study programs and institutes and organizations
involved in research relating to conflict resolution and dispute settlement, see INSTITUTE FOR
WORLD ORDER, PEACE AND WORLD ORDER STUDIES: A CURRICULUM GUIDE 373-86 (3d ed.
1981). A number of these, such as the Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law School and
its Harvard Negotiation Project, expressly adopt an interdisciplinary approach. There is a
need, in particular, to integrate the insights of legal and social science research in this respect, and to provide more occasions for lawyers and social scientists interested in these
problems to talk and work together.
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an international institution, such as the U.N., in a third party role, as
contrasted with a state or individual?
- What do we mean by "settlement of a dispute" or an "acceptable
outcome" and, in particular, what affects the parties' perceptions as
to the "equity" or "fairness" of a particular outcome? Is "fairness"
primarily substantive or procedural, against what base lines or by
what criteria are the parties likely to judge it, and how can we best
achieve it? More generally, how can we best define or measure the
"quality" of dispute resolution processes and outcomes?
- Can we say anything about when is the "right time" for various
types of intervention? How important are personal interrelations between individual participants in settlement processes? Can nongovernmental organizations play a more useful role in dispute
settlement?
- How can disputing parties best protect themselves against improper
overreaching or counterproductive interference by a third party?
How can a third party best protect itself from becoming enmeshed or
blackmailed in the dispute?
- What affects third party perceptions of the legitimacy and persuasiveness of the disputing parties' positions? Is there a difference between the type of argumentation the parties use in negotiation to try
to persuade each other, and the type of argumentation they use in
third party contexts to try to persuade the third party?
- What role do international law, generalized norms, or general "public opinion" and the attitude of third states play in dispute resolution? What does "social pressure" mean and how does, or can, it affect dispute-resolution processes? Are perceptions of legitimacy
relevant only to adjudication or other "legal" techniques of settlement, or do they affect non-adjudicative methods of third-party settlement as well?
- In what kind of cases is it important to successful intervention that
the third party be able to provide specific resources, particularly the
resources to help the parties manage the risks of potential settlement
arrangements,and how can such resources be made more available?
- What do we mean by "face" - the quality of respect or reputation
that states (and officials) seem so concerned with "losing" by giving
in to settlements, and how can we reduce the obstructive influence of
such considerations on settlement efforts?
- What is the effect of "trust" and "distrust" on dispute settlement
efforts, and how can third parties help disputing states to overcome
or counterbalance distrust?
- Is it desirable or undesirable for a third party to be "powerful" or
have some independent basis of influence over the disputing parties?
More generally, what is the role of power or force in third party settlement? Can there be anappropriate role for "creative coercion."
- In what respects do mediators or conciliators behave differently
from adjudicators or judges, and what makes them act and see their
roles as different? What do the parties, or the "general public", ex-
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pect of third parties entrusted with these different roles?
- How can third parties better contribute to the settlement of the
complex and pervasive internal racial, ethnic and religious strife
which increasingly threatens international order (e.g., in South Africa, the Middle East, Cyprus, Northern Ireland, Sri Lanka, and elsewhere)? Clearly, it is becoming increasingly difficult to draw any
sharp lines between international (or external) and domestic (or internal) disputes. Do we need to develop new approaches or ways of
thinking to help us to deal effectively with these "mixed" or "transnational" kinds of disputes?
Ninth, the international community should be more assertive in insisting that parties accept third party intervention in disputes which
threaten international peace and security or, indeed, the international
community's general welfare. It is now widely recognized that, for better
or worse, the world has become an interdependent community and that
serious disputes and conflict are now everyone's business. The idea that
states are free to conduct their quarrels however they wish and without
regard to the cost to others is outdated and has no place in a nuclear age.
Finally, once again, we should not forget that international third
party dispute settlement has a symbolic significance as well as practical
importance. The concept that disputes and conflicts within a group are
not simply the business of those directly involved but are of concern of
every member is at the root of civilized and ordered society. Consequently, third party dispute settlement, and institutions such as the International Court of Justice which implement its use, can encourage
growing perceptions of international community and play a crucial role in
the development of a more peaceful, just and decent world.

